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Rev. Carroll investigates the lack of
acceptable, precise definitions of life,
death, man in the discussions of life
control and death control. The Chris-

tian must II1SISt, he concludes, that
such definitions and resultant standards of conduct safeguard the dignity
and destiny of man.

Life Control and Death Control,
Definitions and the Dignity of Man
Rev. Charles Carroll

To discuss the prolongation of life
without also discussing the abbreviation of li fe, represented by abortion
on demand, is to ignore the total
problem - that of life control and
death control. Justification for what is
purported to be " liberalized abortion"
was first sought on the basis of incest ,
rape , potential deformity of the fetus,
and danger to the physical and/or
mental health of the mother. Let us

examine each of these "reasons" for
liberalized abortion.
Incest was advanced as a reason for
abortion more because of the emotional value it can command in a
debate rather than from any rea l
concern for the woman. In fact ,
proponents of libera lized abortion
were well aware of the fact that parties
to an incestuous relationship would
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seldom, if ever, seek abort ion on this
ground because of fear of publici ty .
In the case of rape as a cause for
abortion, the distinction between
statutory and crimin al rape was rarely
made. Infrequent mention was made
of the pregnancies experienced by
known rape victims and almost no
mention was made of the freedom
from fear that comes with immediate
medical care .
As far as potential deformity of the
fetus was concerned , frequent mention
was made of recurrent rubella epidemics and of other possible deformities that could occur, although mention of new vaccines and new
treatments was rare. The inerrancy of
diagnosis was always assumed.
Threat to the physical and/or
mental health of the mother was
advanced as a reason for liberalized
abortion, but it was never explic itly
defined. The claim of threat to the
mental health of the mother was
considered substantial if it was confirmed by a psychotherapist following
an hour-long interview. Similarly,
threat to physical health was also
advanced as a substantial claim , in
spite of the fact that medical advances
have rendered such threats minimal.
Even though the adequacy of the
reasons for liberalized abortion is
questionable , abortion proposals have
been widely accepted. What are the
underlying causes of this wide acceptance?F irst, man's loss of faith in the
future ; second , his fear of losing what
he has; third , his naive belief that "the
pursuit of happiness" will immunize
him from pain and that his hedonism
and others' hedonism will never bring
them into contlict.
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It is certainly no mere coincidence
that insistence upon a woman's right
to abortion on demand comes at a
time when motherhood has been
robbed of its dignity; when parenthood has lost its sense of privilege;
when family life is disintegrating ;
when man and the society in which he
lives are engulfed by nihilism ; when
men's anxieties for their own future
would deny the unborn the right to
li fe ; and when biological determinists
- with un substantiable statistics have filled men with such fear of a
population explosion that they feel
driven to voluntary life control measures lest mandatory controls be
imposed .
At no time in th is controversy have
men paused long enough to realize
that by not defining what they mean
by life, death, and man , they have
accepted definitions which may well
affect them as long as they live and
even determine the number of years
they may be permitted to live.
Most scientists agree that the
uniquely human life begins at conception. In the U.S., prenatal life may be
taken at different times in its
development : In Cali fornia, up to the
20th week of life; in New York , up to
the 24th week. Some present abortion
proposals suggest that no time limit
should be specified.
If proponents of abortion are
pressed to define life , they talk of
viability. If pressed to define viability,
they exp lain it as the point at which
the fetus becomes capable of life
independent of the mother.
Let us now examine what the word
"independent" means to any defini-
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tion of life. The retarded are not
independent. Some of us can still
remember the Gestapo's call upon
Pastor von Bodelschwingh and their
demand that he deliver up his young
patients. The totally disabled victims
of automobile and industrial accidents
are not independent. Some of us wince
when we hear hospital beds spoken of
as "precious hospital resources," with
the implication that they should be
made available first to those who can
be rehabilitated and who can again
become productive. The disabled veterans of our wars are not independent.
Some of us recall pictures in Life (May
22, 1970) of the treatment given to
American soldiers who recently returned from the war in Southeast Asia
to Veterans Administration hospitals
in the U.S. The mentally ill are not
independent. Some of us can still
remember Hadamar near Marburg,
Sonnenstein near Dresden, and similar
institutions in Germany in which
240,000 of 300,000 mental patients
were liquidated in the years 1939-45 .
The aged and the senile are not
independent. Some of us know all too
well the neglect shown them in our
time (marked as it is by disruption of
home life) and the decrease in Church
giving and state aid , despite the
increased need.
When Robert Ardrey writes in Life
(Feb. 20, 1970) that "The humanist's
preoccupation with the numbers game
has sacrificed quality for human
quantity," the reader cannot but be
reminded of the use of this very term
"quality of life" by the masters of
Auschwitz and Buchenwald. When
Ardrey complains that "Life must be
prolonged, whatever agony it presents
the dying. A child defective must
somehow be saved sufficiently to join
the breeding population . To restrict
the reproductive righ ts of the genetically afflicted is considered an act of
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discrimination ," the reader readily
perceives the relationship between this
ideology and population control and
prevention of "pollution of the gene
pool," both coming at a tim·e when we
have broken the genetic code and
fashioned a gene. l
Ardrey's solutions become clear a
few paragraphs later. "We," he insists ,
"must consider enforced contraception, whether through taxation on
surplus children or through more
severe means such as conception
license . Abortion should be freely
available to those suffering unintended
pregnancy." Whether women today
who seek abortion on demand have
ever contemplated the possibility of
abortion on demand of the state, they
should consider Ardrey's word s. Taxation on surplus children or limits on
state aid are merely subtle fo rms of
demand.
That these proposed solution s
would be in'ternational in their application and that the "haves" would apply
a policy akin to th at of triage 2 to the
"have nots" in the distribution of food
surpluses becomes indelibly clear when
Ardrey declares , "In internationa l
relations any aid to peoples who
through ignorance , prejudice or politica hypnosis fail to control their
numbers might be forbidden."
He does not identify who the "we"
are who will make and implement
these decisions or by what means they
will be made . Neither does he specify
what world agency would support
them or what power would be made
available to them for enforcing their
aims. What is clear is that an elitist
"we" is bent upon gaining public
acceptance of its population control
policies at a time when the Census
Bureau concedes that its 1967 projec-
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tion of the population of the U.S . in
the year 2000 may be an overestimate
of 100,000,000 .3 Such a program as
Ardrey proposes - to quote from the
late Thomas Merton's com mentary on
Ardrey's "African Genesis" - is
rooted in the "tough and call ous
romanticism of the street gang or of
the fascist storm troop - a romanticism no less fallac ious and deceptive for
the fact that it also on occasion covers
itself with a veneer of 'rea lism' and
pseudo-science .,,4
When
Life's
editors
headed
Ardrey's paragraphs on th e birth rate
with the words "Man Has Lost Birth
Contro l Instinct " and his paragraphs
on proposed so lutions with "Co mp assio n Has Sacrificed Man's Qu ality"
they were apparently accusing our
fat hers of committing crimes against
humanity when they educated men to
care for their fellowmen; constructed
hospitals, schools , and churches; built
dams, roads , sanitation , and water
filtration systems at home and overseas. In other words , to the proponents of Ardrey 's argumen ts compassion has become a sin and charity a
vice. This philosophy ordains that man
live by se le ct ive breeding and sc ience
alone. It erases the last vestige of
difference between physician and
veterinarian and rewords the Book of
Job (1 .2 Ib) to read: "Scientific Man
gave , Scientific Man has taken away ;
blessed be the name of Scientific
Man ."
If the li fe control arguments have
left individual human life undefined,
th e death cont rol arguments have left
individual human death similarly undefined, with no less significant
implications.
''The Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical
School to Examine the Definition of
Brain Death" li sted four criteria:
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"Unreceptivity and unresponsitivity" ;
"no movements or breathing"; " no
reflexes"; and "fla t encephalogram. ,,5
Wh ile the authors might be faulted for
failure to use the term "total brain
death" and while there were some
infelicitous uses of the term "bra in
damage," this definition represents an
honest effort to be more prec ise than
traditional definitions of death have
been. However, it may raise more
questions than it answers. As Dr.
David D. Rutstein of Harvard suggests:
We are saying that in man life "exists
only when he is aware of and can
respond to his environment." Dr.
Ru tstein himself asks: "Does acceptance of this concept mean that it is no
longer necessary to treat ... the
se nile?" " How do eligible donors
differ in principle from totally feebleminded individuals?" " Does this new
definition ... open up new channels
of cri min al activity that will lead to
the burking 6 of patients to increase
the supply of eligible donors?"7
The demand for a new definition of
death is obviously linked to the
question of pro lo ngat ion of life and no
less obviously linked to that of organ
transplantation . The question of prolongation of life reflects the need for
new definitions of "ordi nary" and
"extraordinary" means of preserving
life, because Pope Pius XII's definitions have been rendered obso lete by
recent medical advances . Its concern is
with withdrawal of life su pport systems, allowing the patient to die. No
direct in terven tion in th e pa tien t's
dying is contemplated. The quest ion
of orga n transplants reflects the need
for organs in a viable state and possible
reestablishment of life support systems
after a declaration of death. When the
dea th of the organism as a whole has
been declared, death of the whole
organism can be postponed.
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It is precisely this aspect of the
problem that troubles the philosopher.
Hans Jonas, professor of philosophy at
the New School of Social Research in
New York, insists that no definition is
a substitute for knowledge; that "it is
one thing when to cease delaying
death, but another when to start doing
violence to the body . .. For the first
purpose, we need not know the exact
borderline ... between life and death
- we leave nature to cross it. ... For
the second purpose, we must know . . .
; and to use any definition short of the
maximal for perpetrating on a possibly
penultimate state what only the
ultimate state can permit is to arrogate
a knowledge which , I think, we cannot
possibly have.',8

Moreover, there is reason to fear
the use to which such a definition can
be put. As Jonas points out, "If the
comatose patient is by definition dead,
he is a patient no more but a corpse,
with which can be done whatever law
or custom or the deceased's will or
next of kin permit and sundry
interests urge to do with a corpse . . . .
Why turn the respirator off? Once we
are assured that we deal with a cadaver
there are no logical reasons against
(and strong pragmatic reasons for)
going on with the artificial 'animation '
and keeping the 'deceased's' body on
call, as a bank for life-fresh organs,
possibly also as a plant for manufacturing hormones or other bio-chemical
compounds in demand . ... Tempting
also is the idea of a self-replenishing
blood bank . And that is not all . Let us
not forget research. Why shouldn ' t the
most wonderful surgical and grafting
experiments be conducted on the
complaisant subject-nonsubject, with
no limits set to daring? Why not
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immunological explorations, infections
with diseases old and new, trying out
of drugs?,,9 Professor Jonas lJIight al30
have mentioned present-day discussions of the purchase and sale of
human organs and of amending anatomical gift laws by declaring human
organs a natural and national resource. I 0
To say that anyone of these things

can happen is not to say that it will
happen, but the temptation to do
what one can do has been known to
become irresistible. History and definitions have often unwittingly provided
a rationale for man's inhumanity to
man. In less than five hundred years ,
the West has moved from the concept
of maiestas (sovereignty) of Jean
Bodin ll to the absolute monarchy of
Louis XIV ; through the "nation in
arms"
of
Napoleon
to
the
Wehrwirtschaft and Totalkrieg of
Hitler.
We have moved from slavery to its
abolition ; through the reinstitution of
slavery in the form of racism to a
genocide "so sterilized by terms like
'Losungsmoglichkeit,' 'Sonderbehandlung ,' 'Evakuierung,' and others that it
is possible to ignore the fact that
human
beings
are
being annihilated ."12

We have moved from the Industrial
Revolution through the Technological
Revolution and the Cultural Explosion
with such speed that, as Edward
Schillebeeckx perceives, "The constraint imposed by rationality - the
principle which is above all operative
in the designing of a new society and a
new future - is threatening to reduce
man himself and the future to the level
of things - more material for objective
analysis and planning."l 3
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The bombing of Rotterdam; the
attempt to " erase " Coventry; the
900-day siege of Leningrad; the
concentration camps of Nazi Germany; the fire storm of Dresden; the
detonation of the atomic bomb over
Hiroshima ; the brutal imposition of
Soviet rule on Hungary and Czechoslovakia ; the mass murder of hundreds of
thousands of Indonesians; the attempted "liquidation " of monarchist
Yemenites , South Sudanese, Kurds,
Tibetans, and the Patachus Indians in
Brazil ; the starvation of the Biafrans;
and the Great Power rivalries reflected
in the present wars in Southeast Asia
and the Middle East - all have merely
brought the premises of an earlier age
to their inexorable conclusion , and
violence "simplifies" human relations
by denying the other exists .
Moreover , "the revolution that is
taking place now (is) in the danger of a
se lf-made future" and the "real danger
(is) no longer a flight from th e world ,
but a flight from the future, and in
many different forms - the 'world'
has , in fact, become the 'future' ."14
For this sickness unto death ,
Christianity has an antidote . As Karl
Rahner sees it, Christianity is not only
the religion of the future, but the
religion of the absolute future . ls The
significance of Christianity for intra-mund ane society and its goals lies in
its hope. "By its hope for an absolute
future," Rahner declares, "Christianity
defends man against the temptation of
engaging in the justified intra-mundane
efforts for the future with such energy
that every generation is always sacrificed in favour of the next , so that the
future becomes a Moloch before
whom the man existing at present is
butchered for the sake of some man
who is never real and always still to
come.,,16
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While he wrote these words in
"Marxist Utopia and the Christian
Future of Man," they are peculiarly
applicable to a world which would
appear to be willing to sacrifice the
principle that utter helplessness demands utter protection ; a world which
would appear to be unmindful of the
fact that denial of the right to life to
anyone is a threat to the right to life
of everyone ; a world in which a
distinguished few in science are asking
if parenthood is a right or a privilege
and insisting that only if it is viewed as
a privilege is there hope for mankind .17
Men may scoff at Dostoyevski's
dictum that without God nothing is
immoral, but surely some of the
greatest scientists of our time have
found these words worth pondering . If
the life scientist is to avoid the
experience that the physical scientist
had in the development of atomic
fission and if he is to be spared the
gnawing after thoughts that plagued
Max Planck, Otto Hahn, Albert Einstein , and J. Robert Oppenheimer , he
would do well to reflect upon the
ambiguity of progress, the fallibility of
human judgment, and man's proclivity
to self-centeredness in a world in
which Jacques Ellul feels "That
violence is so generously condoned .. .
shows that Hitler won his war after
all." I 8
There is a reason why Max Planck
observed: "Everything that is relative
presupposes the existence of something that is absolute."19 A reason
why Albert Einstein declared : "Only
the Church stood squarely across the
path of Hitler's campaign for suppressing the truth. I never had any
interest in the Church before, but now
... I am forced to confess that what I
once despised I now praise unreservedly ."20 A reason why J. Robert
Oppenheimer stated: "I believe the
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strength and soundness of Christian
sensibility, the meaning of love and
charity have changed the world at least
as much as technological developments."21 This statement was made
by the same Oppenheimer who said
that the construction of the atomic
bomb brought him to recognize sin.
Man is asking again who he is and
what he wants to be . He is looking to
his past and to the future to find
answers. And while he may find it
easier "to fall into (his) own emptiness
than into the abyss of the Blessed
Mystery ,"2 2 he is not finding it more
courageous or more true.
The Old Testament talks of life
"neither in the idealistic nor the
dualistic sense .,,23 Rather it talks of
life as the highest good and of God as
Lord of Life and death .24 Indeed,
"God did not ," as von Rad points out,
"allow the man who had become a
fratricide (Genesis 4: IS) to be completely outlawed - even his life he
took into a mysterious protective
rela tionship. ,,25
The New Testament talks of life in
Christ, "the life of Resurrection
(which) . . . only reaches full development in the future . .. and (while)
. .. to this extent , still an object of
hope . . . is nevertheless in a certain
sense a present reality ."26
With Jurgen Moltmann, man is
asking if "the real category of history
is no longer the past and the transient,
but the future .,,27 He asks if "To
expect and seek a del iverance which
does not embrace all that is and all
that is not yet , has disastrous results
when everyttting is staked upon it."28
And whether it is not true that man
"Always
stands both within
ttistory and also above history. " 29
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Shortly after the first World War,
Karl Barth insisted that "If Christianity be not altogether and unreservedly
eschatology, there remains in it no
relationship to Christ."3o Almost 15
years after the second World War, Karl
Rahner insisted that "Anything that
cannot be read and understood as a
Christological assertion is not a genuine eschatological assertion.',3 1
Man questions whether both may
not be right, and he also asks - in
whatever words he may use - if
Rahner may not also be right in
asserting that "Christology is the end
and beginning of anthropology ."32
Think of the implications of this
sta temen t.
If Alexander Solzhenitsyn, this
year's winner of the Nobel prize for
literature , can rai se his voice to claim
that "The meaning of existence (is) to
preserve unspoiled , undisturbed and
undistorted the image of eternity with
which each person is born ,,,3 3 can we
not raise ours in concert with him to
sepak again of the imago Dei? Surely
"Scripture knows of no life not
worthy to be definitive , it does not
recognize any life as superfluous.',34

Finally, we must realize how
inextricably interwoven are the remissio peccatorum which redeems us
from our past ; the missio of love to
which we have been called in the
present; and the promissio of a future
in Wllich man and the whole creation
will be redeemed and in which history
will find its fulfillment. (Romans 8 :22 ,
23)
The question that is fundamental in
the present controversy - whether the
specific issue be abortion or "updating" death, euthanasia or genetic
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engineering, artificial inovulation or
cloning , dominion over one's person
versus society's dominion over one
person - is not so much a question of
when individual human life begins or
when it ends. Rather it is a question of
who man is . While man cannot be
described in a few words, some from
the pen of Karl Rahner speak with
peculiar eloquence on these issues:
Man "is not merely an instance of the
universal, each man is something
unique and ultimately never someone
who can be totally deduced. . ..
Because he is an individual, he has a
valid existence which , as a real
existence, does not coincide with his
spatio-temporal existence ; he is 'immortal' and the subject of an eternal
destination and destiny. This is why
the individual man , who is now, may
never be forcibly sacrificed, in a
manner which destroys him, for the
future of 'humanity', of the others
who come after him .,,3 5

Furthermore , "When we have said
everything about ourselves that can be
described and defined , we still have
said nothing about ourselves, unless we
have included or implied the fact that
we are beings who are referred to the
incomprehensible God ."3 6
In St. Ambrose 's time , it was
necessary to speak of "Agnoscenda
gratia, sed non ignoranda natura.,,37
Henri de Lubac sa id : "I would wish to
assert both terms of this precept to the
full.,,38 But there remains the question of whether modern man in
agnoscenda natura has not fallen into

ignoranda gratia.

Let us - Catholic , Orthodox , and
Protestant
insist upon precise
definitions of life, death, and man. Let
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us caution medicine of the precedents
that it is abandoning and the new ones
that it is establishing; of the socioethical issues with which it has
involved itself in the abortion debate
and of the fears which it has
engendered in many in our society
who recognize the socio -e thical issues
implicit in the definitio n of brain
death. Medicine has its rights , but it
also has its duties. The jurist has an
interest in the socio-ethical. So , too,
do the philosopher and theologian. If
Clemenceau suggested that wars are
too important to be left to generals , is
it not possible that Scientific Man may
find that his fellow human beings
consider science too important to be
left to him , especially in consequence
of his unilateral assumption of prerogatives which society did not delegate
to him alone? Imagin e for a moment
the anomaly of Scientific Man's
position on abortion and his definition
of dea th. If a functioning brain is to
serve as man's claim to life; if death of
the organism as a whole is to be
declared on th e basis of brain death,
then by what logic can the fetus with a
functioning brain be treated as subhuman or non-human?
Medicine has to confine itself to the
medical or insist that it alone of aJJ
disciplines has the right to define and
legi sla te ; that, in abortion, it alone has
the right to effect social and ethical
change under the cloak of the
confidentiality of the patient-doctor
relationship ; that , in transplant surgery , it alone can assume the exclusive
righ t to define death , declare death,
and then devise implementations of
those decisions on the basis that it
alone has the knowledge to do so.
Society has not only the right but the
duty to call for multidisciplinary
dialogue and decision-making on such
issues.
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The spectre of Galileo may well
have haunted the deliberations of
Vatican II, but the spectre of a
Hiroshima haunts many a sensitive
scientist in his research. Nothing less
than the future of man is at stake.
However pluralistic the society is in
which we live, we should not only
insist upon precise definitions but
upon precise standards of conduct in
the implementation of those definitions. We must accept only those
definitions and standards that recog·
nize the dignity and destiny of man definitions and standards with which
all men, rich and poor, powerful and
powerless, can live and die.

Let us pray for receptive and
willing hearts that the warnings God
sends us may penetrate our minds and
help us to overcome the wilderness of
this life . . . lest those who are our
executioners today may at some
future time be our accusers for the
suppression of truth.,,3 9
Never has there been greater need
than now for those who in Christ's
name and for His sake would serve
mankind as Jurgen Moltmann proposes
"not . . . that this world may remain
what it is , or may be preserved in the
state in which it is, but in order that it
may transform itself and become what
is promised to be.,,4o

Let us also be mindful of the
educative role of the law in our
communities and mindful of the need
for Christian witness - a witness of
word and example. Only free man can
unite; only in Christ's service can their
freedom be perfect; only in His will
can they find peace .

Is there hope? Yes, from those
whose hope arises from hope in Christ ;
those who, in the words of St.
Augustine , at the same time realize
that "there is no love without hope,
no hope without love, and neither love
nor hope without faith.,,41

The present mood of the world
may be of another mind , but in the
currents and cross-currents of claim
and counter·claim, the use and abuse
of statistics, the insistence upon
humanizing the machine and mechamzmg man , upon relativizing the
absolute and absolutizing the relative,
let us remember that love of God and
neighbor go hand in hand. Lest there
be doubt of the kind of love which
calls us and to which we are called, it
is that described in the new commandmen t: "Love one another, even as I
have loved you." (John 13:34) To
adopt any other course is to fail Lord
and neighbor. As the German Jesuit
martyr , Alfred Delp, wrote from his
prison cell in 1944: "At their core,
these times through which we are
living also carry the blessing and the
mystery of God. It is only a matter of
waiting and knowing how to wait until
the hour has struck.
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Man-made men
" self-created
man,,42 if you will - may be viewed
as an experimental laboratory. God·
created man can be viewed only as a
privileged sanctuary .
REFERENCES
I. Nature, Vol. CCXXVII, July 4, 1970,

pp.27-33.
2. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Die·
tionary, XXIV Ed., W.B. Saunders Co.,
Philadelphia, 1965 : "the sorting out
and classification of casualties of war or
other disaster to determine priority of
need and place of treatment."
3. "U.S. Population Forecast Is Cut," San
Francisco Chronicle, Times-Post Service, Aug. 13, 1970, pp. 1 and 30.
4. Thomas Merton , Faith and Violence .
University of Notre Dame Press , 1968,
p.104.
5. Journal of the American Medical
Association, Vol. CCV , No.6 , Aug. 5,
1968.
6. Webster 's VII New Collegiate Die·
tionary, G. and C. Merriam Co. ,
Springfield, Mass., 1969 : From "Wil·
liam Burke, died 1829, irish criminal
executed for this crime ... to suffocate
or strangle in order to obtain a body to

245

be sold fo r dissection."
7. Daedalu s. Spring, 1969 , p. 526 .
8. Ibid., p. 244.
9. Hans Jonas, Against th e Stream . a
personal communi cation (July, 1970)
fro m a work that hopefull y will be
published soon.
10. Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., "Supplying
Orga ns for Transplantation ," Michigan
Law R eview. Vol. LXVIII , No . 5 , April,
1970, pp. 811-866 , especially pp.
846-847.
II. "Maies ta s est summa in cives ac
subdit os legibusqu e soluta po testas ,"
See OUo vo n Gierk e, Th e Development
of Political Th eory, W. W. Norton , New
York , 19 39, p. 158. C.J. Fr iedrich,
Co nstitutional Government and Demo·
cracy, Ginn and Company, Bosto n,
1946 , p. 102 ; Francis Co ker , R eadings
ill Political Philosophy, Macmillan and
Co., New York , 193 8, p. 374 ; and
George Sabine, A History of Political
Til eory. Henry Holt and Co., New
York , 193 7, p. 405.
12. Ra bbi Richard L. Rubin stein , After
A usch witz, Bo bbs-Merrill , 1966, p. 77.
13. E. SchilJebeeckx, OP, God ti, e Future
of Mall. Sheed and Ward, New York ,
1968, p. 176.
14. Ibid .. p . 177.
15. Karl Raimer, SJ , Th eological In vestiga·
tions. Helico n Press, Baltimo re, 1969,
Vo l. VI , pp. 60, 61.
16. Ibid., p . 66 .
17. Garrett Hardin, " Parentho od : Right or
Privilege?" Science. Vol. CLXlX , No .
3944 , July 31 , 1970, p. 427 : See also
Pa ul Eluli ch, Th e Populatioll 9Bomb ,
Ball antin e Books, New York , 196 8;
Garrett Hardin , "The Tragedy of
Co mm ons, " Science. Vol. CLXJI , No.
3859, Dec. 13, 1968, pp. 1243-4 8; and
Robert H. Williams, MD, "Our Role in
the Genera tion , Modifica tion and T ermination of Life," Th e Archives of
Internal Medicin e, Vol. CXXlV, No.2,
August, 1969, pp. 215-237.
18. Jacques Ellul, Violence, Sea bury Press,
New York , 1969, p. 29.
19. Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography,
Philosophical Library , New York, 1949 ,
p.46.
20. Arthur Cochrane, The Church 's Confes·
sion Under Hitler, Westminister Press,
Philadelphia, 1962, p. 40.
21. J. Robert Oppenheimer , " Where Is
Science Heading? " R ealities, September, 1963.
22. Karl Raimer , SJ, Th eological In vestiga·
tions, Helico n Press, Baltimo re, 1966,
Vo l. V , p. 8.
246

23. Bible Key Words from Gerhard Kittel's
"Theo logisches Wort erbuch wm Neuen
Testament ," Harper , New York , 1965 ,
Vol. V , Book II , p.19.
24. Ibid. , p. 4 . See also Numb ers
XXVlI:16 ; Job XJI : IO ; Deuteronomy
XXXlI :39.
25. Gerhard von Rad , Old Testament
Th eology, Harper and Row , New Yo rk ,
1962, Vol. I , p. 155.
26. Bible Key Words, op cit., Vol. V, Book
II , p. 68. See also Roman s V :I-II and
VIII : I 2-39 ; I Corintilians XV ; and II
Corinthialls V : 1-5 .
27 . Jurgen Moltma nn , Th eology of Hope,
Harper and Row , New York , 1967 , p.
260.
28. Ibid., p. 263.
29. Ibid. , p. 271.
30. Ibid., ci ted by Moltm ann , p. 39.
3 1. Karl Rahner , SJ , Th eological In vestigations, Helicon Press, Baltimore, 1966 ,
Vo l. IV , p . 34 3.
32. Ibid. , p. 117.
33. Alexander Solsz henitsyn , Cancer Ward,
Bantam Books, Farrar Straus and
Giroux, Inc., New York , 196 8, p. 428.
34. Ka rl Rahn er, SJ , Th eological In vestiga·
tions. Helico n Press, Bal timore, 1966,
Vol. IV, p. 351.
35. Karl Rahn er , SJ , Th eological Investiga·
tions. Helicon Press, Baltimore, Third
Printing, 1966, Vol. II , p. 239.
36. Karl Rahner, S1. Th eological In vestiga·
tions, Helicon Press, Baltimo re, 1966,
Vol. IV, p. 109.
37. St. Ambr ose ,In Lucam , Book VIII , No .
32.
38. Henri de Lubac, Th e Mystery of the
Supernatural, Herder and Herder, 1967 ,
p. 42.
39. Alfred Delp, SJ , Th e Prison Meditations
of Fath er Delp, with an introduction by
Thomas Me rton , Macmillan and Co. ,
New York , 196 3, p. 22.
40. Jurgen Moltmann, Th eology of Hope,
Harper and Row , New York , 1967 , p.
327.
41. Th e Basic Works of St. A ugustine, ed.
by Whitney Je nnings Oates, Random
House, New York , 1948, Vol. I, p. 661
("The Enchiridion ," Chapter VlIl) .
42. Karl Rahner , SJ , " Experime nt : Man,"
Th eology
Digest, Sesquicentennial
Issue, 1968 , pp. 57-69 , and "Zum
Problem der genetischen Manipula tion
aus der Sicht des Theologen," in
"Menschenzu chtung: Das Problem der
genetischen
Manipulierung
des
Menschen ," edited by Friedrich Wagn er
and published by Verlag C. H. Beck ,
Muni ch, 1969, pp. 135-166.

Linacre Qua rterly

